San Diego, CA


SOC analyst. CompTIA CySA+, CompTIA Security+, CompTIA A+, Microsoft Applied Skills (Azure networking) and CCNA coursework.

Microsoft Applied Skills: Configure secure access to your workloads using Azure networkingNewest · Microsoft · earned · Verify on Microsoft Learn (opens in a new tab)

Five hands-on labs Abraham built and ran himself: a Wazuh SIEM, an osTicket help desk, a Wireshark capture, an Apache server on Linux, and an Active Directory domain. What you see in each section is the data those systems produced. Labs 06–09 are completed GRC study playbooks — RMF/ATO, ACAS/Nessus, DISA STIGs and eMASS/OpenRMF — written against the official references and labelled as training scenarios.

profile

Experience

Abraham has spent nearly five years keeping Department of Defense networks running in San Diego: first with the Marine Corps' 1st Network Battalion at MCRD, then at NAVWAR headquarters.

Most days that meant imaging and deploying machines, untangling Group Policy and access problems, setting people up with PIV cards and YubiKeys, and clearing vulnerability findings before they turned into audit items.

Before IT he worked in operations and compliance roles, and he holds a master's degree in piano performance from USC.

Active Secret clearance (Department of Defense), U.S. citizen

  1. Feb 2025 to Sep 2026

    Senior IT Specialist, IT Network Infrastructure Support

    Naval Information Warfare Systems Command (NAVWAR) Headquarters

    Apex Systems, subcontractor to Leidos · San Diego, CA · DoD / NMCI enterprise (the Navy enterprise network)

    • Stood up a reimaging facility and ran MDT and IPv4 PXE network-boot imaging surges of 30+ assets per day to keep deployments on a standard security baseline.
    • Delivered enterprise technical support and field services across NMCI at NAVWAR HQ, maintaining uptime and cybersecurity compliance for naval command operations.
    • Troubleshot Group Policy application failures, isolating and documenting server-side root causes for the systems engineering teams.
    • Provisioned YubiKey and PIV hardware tokens, handling secure PIN setup and multi-factor onboarding.
    • Automated routine administrative workflows with MultiTool scripting while keeping audit-ready records in ITSM Remedy.
    • MDT / PXE imaging
    • Group Policy / Active Directory
    • YubiKey / PIV
    • ITSM Remedy
    • Forescout
    • ACAS (Nessus)
  2. Jan 2022 to Feb 2025

    Senior IT Specialist, Cybersecurity Analyst, End-User Support

    Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego, 1st Network Battalion

    Apex Systems · San Diego, CA · DoD Cyberspace Workforce (DCWF) baseline

    • Maintained MECM client health compliance across 1,000+ enterprise workstations for continuous policy enforcement and software distribution.
    • Reimaged 300+ laptops to SSD under the Service Life Extension Program, making MCRD the first western-region station to fully upgrade.
    • Ran weekly SOX-readiness and IT general control checks, applying patches and maintaining Active Directory accounts.
    • Supported recurring ACAS (Nessus) vulnerability scans, driver and OS patching, and AppGate network authentication.
    • Resolved about 1,000 incidents and work orders over three years, including roughly 300 VIP and command escalations a year, in ITSM Remedy.
    • MECM
    • PXE boot
    • ACAS (Nessus)
    • AppGate
    • Active Directory

Education

  • Cybersecurity Analytics BootcampFullstack Academy at Caltech CTME · April 2021
  • Master of Music, Piano PerformanceUniversity of Southern California · 2004 to 2007
  • Bachelor of Arts, MusicPepperdine University · 2000 to 2004

Toolkit

  • SIEM and monitoring

    • Wazuh
    • Wireshark / tshark
  • Vulnerability and compliance

    • ACAS (Nessus)
    • Forescout
  • Identity and access

    • Active Directory
    • Group Policy
    • Samba AD
    • YubiKey / PIV
    • AppGate
  • Endpoint deployment

    • MECM
    • MDT / PXE imaging
  • Platforms and services

    • Linux
    • Ubuntu
    • Debian
    • Docker
    • Apache
    • MariaDB
    • PHP
  • Service management

    • ITSM Remedy
    • osTicket

SIEM lab with Wazuh

One Wazuh manager plus a search indexer, with three Linux endpoints shipping their authentication and package logs to a single place where they can be alerted on.

wazuh.managerAmazon Linux 2023 · 127.0.0.1 · agent 000
app-server-01Ubuntu 24.04.5 LTS · 192.168.171.4 · agent 005
db-server-01Debian GNU/Linux 12 · 192.168.171.5 · agent 006
workstation-01Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS · 192.168.171.6 · agent 007
wazuh-alerts-*captured33 alerts
event referenceLinux event captured → Windows equivalent
Event as capturedWhat it meansWindows IDWindows event
sshd: authentication failed (rule 5760)PAM + sshd rejected a password for a real account4625An account failed to log on
PAM: User login failed (rule 5503)The PAM stack recorded the failed authentication4625An account failed to log on
sshd: authentication success (rule 5715)A session was established over SSH4624An account was successfully logged on
PAM: Login session opened (rule 5501)The session was opened for the account4624An account was successfully logged on
New user added to the system (rule 5902)useradd created a local account4720A user account was created
New group added to the system (rule 5901)groupadd created a local group4731A security-enabled local group was created
New dpkg package installed (rule 2902)A package was installed, read from dpkg.log11707Windows Installer: installation operation completed successfully (Application log)

This build used Linux endpoints, so the captured rows are Linux events. The Windows IDs are the closest documented equivalents: Security-log events from Microsoft's audit reference, and the Windows Installer Application-log event 11707 for the package install — mapped here for anyone arriving from a Windows fleet. No Windows host was part of this build.

How it was built

The Wazuh single-node stack (manager + indexer) on Docker, three endpoint containers on Ubuntu 24.04, Debian 12 and Ubuntu 22.04, each running the official wazuh-agent package. Endpoints run a real sshd and rsyslog so the authentication log is genuine, not synthesised. The Windows event IDs in the reference table are the documented counterparts of these Linux events — no Windows host was part of this build.

lab1-alerts.json

Delivered

  • All three endpoint agents enrolled and reporting
  • Alerts for authentication, account and package events
  • Linux-to-Windows event ID reference
  • Two ingestion faults diagnosed and fixed

Problems solved

  • Agents registered but stayed "Pending"A stale registration from an earlier container held the agent name, so each reconnect hit "Duplicate agent name" and the key exchange never completed. Removing the old agent records and clearing client.keys on each endpoint let them re-enrol cleanly with new IDs.
  • sshd events produced no alertsrsyslogd drops to the syslog user, and the auth.log created at build time was root-owned, so the "open error: Permission denied" was only visible in syslog itself. chown syslog:adm on /var/log/auth.log made the failed-password lines reach Wazuh, and rules 5503 and 5760 started firing immediately.

Outcome

Designed and deployed a containerized Wazuh SIEM, with three Linux endpoints shipping authentication, account and package logs to a central manager and indexer; diagnosed and fixed two ingestion faults along the way.

Help desk ticketing with osTicket

A running osTicket help desk with five support tickets worked from intake through prioritisation, troubleshooting notes, resolution and closure.

osTicket 1.18.4IT Support queue
TicketSubjectRequesterTopicPriorityStatus
#602544Printer on the second floor will not printDana WhitfieldReport a Problemnormalclosed
#413229Locked out of my account after a password changeMarcus ReedAccess Issuehighclosed
#200943Software request: Tableau Desktop for reportingPriya NairGeneral Inquirynormalclosed
#227511Laptop cannot connect to the office Wi-FiTom AlvarezReport a Problemnormalclosed
#774970Suspicious email asking me to re-enter my passwordElena KovacsAccess Issueemergencyclosed
select a ticket

Pick a ticket to read its full thread: the user's message, the internal notes, and the reply that closed it.

How it was built

osTicket 1.18.4 on PHP 8.2 with MariaDB 11. The five tickets were opened through the real client portal form, one per requester, each with its own help topic and priority. They were then worked through osTicket’s ticket model: internal notes at triage, troubleshooting and resolution, a reply to the requester, and closure. That is the same code path the staff panel uses, and everything below is read back out of the database. A discarding sendmail stand-in let the application run without an SMTP server.

lab2-tickets.json

Delivered

  • Five tickets worked from intake to closure
  • Full ticket threads with internal notes
  • Priority set and justified on each ticket
  • Phishing report escalated to security

Outcome

Deployed an osTicket help desk on Docker and worked five support tickets through their full lifecycle: intake, prioritization, troubleshooting notes, user replies and closure, including a phishing report escalated to security.

Network traffic analysis with Wireshark

A saved packet capture of ordinary browsing, read back frame by frame: DNS lookups and their answers, a TCP three-way handshake, and a full HTTP request and response.

display filter
145 frames · 142 kB · 2.096s · lab3.pcapng
filter:no display filter145 shown
No.TimeSourceDestinationProtoLenInfo
10.000000——ICMPv6110Multicast Listener Report Message v2
20.063077——ICMPv686Neighbor Solicitation for fe80::87f:30ff:feb4:5f49
30.263898——ARP42ARP Announcement for 192.168.215.12
40.263912——ARP42ARP Announcement for 192.168.215.12
51.088495——ICMPv6130Multicast Listener Report Message v2
61.093443——ICMPv690Multicast Listener Report Message v2
71.264155——ARP42ARP Announcement for 192.168.215.12
81.264168——ARP42ARP Announcement for 192.168.215.12
91.291129——ARP42Who has 192.168.215.1? Tell 192.168.215.12
101.291140——ARP42Who has 192.168.215.1? Tell 192.168.215.12
111.291171——ARP42192.168.215.1 is at 1e:c1:e0:a6:99:18
121.291204192.168.215.120.250.250.200DNS95Standard query 0xb2b7 A neverssl.com OPT
131.2919940.250.250.200192.168.215.12DNS111Standard query response 0xb2b7 A neverssl.com A 34.223.124.45 OPT
141.298140192.168.215.120.250.250.200DNS94Standard query 0x4729 A example.com OPT
151.2991530.250.250.200192.168.215.12DNS136Standard query response 0x4729 A example.com A 172.66.147.243 A 104.20.23.154 OPT
161.307465192.168.215.120.250.250.200DNS100Standard query 0x4771 A www.wikipedia.org OPT
171.3091420.250.250.200192.168.215.12DNS171Standard query response 0x4771 A www.wikipedia.org CNAME dyna.wikimedia.org A 198.35.26.224 OPT
181.316251192.168.215.120.250.250.200DNS95Standard query 0xc9e2 A info.cern.ch OPT
191.3176660.250.250.200192.168.215.12DNS159Standard query response 0xc9e2 A info.cern.ch CNAME webafs902.cern.ch A 188.184.67.127 OPT
201.321853192.168.215.120.250.250.200DNS95Standard query 0x0ade AAAA info.cern.ch OPT
211.321937192.168.215.120.250.250.200DNS95Standard query 0xc990 A info.cern.ch OPT
221.3234630.250.250.200192.168.215.12DNS171Standard query response 0x0ade AAAA info.cern.ch CNAME webafs902.cern.ch AAAA 2001:1458:201:a4::100:1a0 OPT
231.3237730.250.250.200192.168.215.12DNS159Standard query response 0xc990 A info.cern.ch CNAME webafs902.cern.ch A 188.184.67.127 OPT
241.323897192.168.215.12188.184.67.127TCP7455142 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=3505919540 TSecr=0 WS=1024
251.455447——ICMPv690Multicast Listener Report Message v2
261.538706188.184.67.127192.168.215.12TCP7480 → 55142 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65408 Len=0 MSS=65479 TSval=513136938 TSecr=3505919540 WS=128
271.538728192.168.215.12188.184.67.127TCP6655142 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64512 Len=0 TSval=3505919754 TSecr=513136938
281.539401192.168.215.12188.184.67.127HTTP171GET /hypertext/WWW/TheProject.html HTTP/1.1
291.539493188.184.67.127192.168.215.12TCP6680 → 55142 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=106 Win=65280 Len=0 TSval=513136939 TSecr=3505919755
301.722521188.184.67.127192.168.215.12HTTP2516HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
311.722544192.168.215.12188.184.67.127TCP6655142 → 80 [ACK] Seq=106 Ack=2451 Win=69632 Len=0 TSval=3505919938 TSecr=513137122
321.722637192.168.215.12188.184.67.127TCP6655142 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=106 Ack=2451 Win=69632 Len=0 TSval=3505919938 TSecr=513137122
331.722690188.184.67.127192.168.215.12TCP6680 → 55142 [ACK] Seq=2451 Ack=107 Win=524160 Len=0 TSval=513137122 TSecr=3505919938
341.724877192.168.215.120.250.250.200DNS94Standard query 0x9f83 AAAA example.com OPT
351.724947192.168.215.120.250.250.200DNS94Standard query 0x207d A example.com OPT
361.725078188.184.67.127192.168.215.12TCP6680 → 55142 [FIN, ACK] Seq=2451 Ack=107 Win=524288 Len=0 TSval=513137124 TSecr=3505919938
371.725092192.168.215.12188.184.67.127TCP6655142 → 80 [ACK] Seq=107 Ack=2452 Win=69632 Len=0 TSval=3505919941 TSecr=513137124
381.725079188.184.67.127192.168.215.12TCP6680 → 55142 [RST, ACK] Seq=2452 Ack=107 Win=0 Len=0 TSval=513137124 TSecr=3505919938
391.725141188.184.67.127192.168.215.12TCP5480 → 55142 [RST] Seq=2452 Win=0 Len=0
401.7259850.250.250.200192.168.215.12DNS160Standard query response 0x9f83 AAAA example.com AAAA 2606:4700:10::ac42:93f3 AAAA 2606:4700:10::6814:179a OPT
411.7259850.250.250.200192.168.215.12DNS136Standard query response 0x207d A example.com A 172.66.147.243 A 104.20.23.154 OPT
421.726111192.168.215.12172.66.147.243TCP7448970 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=1575692737 TSecr=0 WS=1024
431.728778——ICMPv6130Multicast Listener Report Message v2
441.750876172.66.147.243192.168.215.12TCP7480 → 48970 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65408 Len=0 MSS=65479 TSval=2353495735 TSecr=1575692737 WS=128
451.750895192.168.215.12172.66.147.243TCP6648970 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64512 Len=0 TSval=1575692762 TSecr=2353495735
461.750987192.168.215.12172.66.147.243HTTP141GET / HTTP/1.1
471.751494172.66.147.243192.168.215.12TCP6680 → 48970 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=76 Win=65280 Len=0 TSval=2353495735 TSecr=1575692762
481.751529172.66.147.243192.168.215.12TCP66[TCP Window Update] 80 → 48970 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=76 Win=523520 Len=0 TSval=2353495736 TSecr=1575692762
491.780657172.66.147.243192.168.215.12HTTP999HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
501.780675192.168.215.12172.66.147.243TCP6648970 → 80 [ACK] Seq=76 Ack=934 Win=64512 Len=0 TSval=1575692791 TSecr=2353495765
511.780828192.168.215.12172.66.147.243TCP6648970 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=76 Ack=934 Win=64512 Len=0 TSval=1575692791 TSecr=2353495765
521.780924172.66.147.243192.168.215.12TCP6680 → 48970 [ACK] Seq=934 Ack=77 Win=523904 Len=0 TSval=2353495765 TSecr=1575692791
531.783977192.168.215.120.250.250.200DNS100Standard query 0x461f AAAA www.wikipedia.org OPT
541.784059192.168.215.120.250.250.200DNS100Standard query 0xd590 A www.wikipedia.org OPT
551.7852360.250.250.200192.168.215.12DNS183Standard query response 0x461f AAAA www.wikipedia.org CNAME dyna.wikimedia.org AAAA 2620:0:863:ed1a::1 OPT
561.7854040.250.250.200192.168.215.12DNS171Standard query response 0xd590 A www.wikipedia.org CNAME dyna.wikimedia.org A 198.35.26.224 OPT
571.785451192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP7438668 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=1012146895 TSecr=0 WS=1024
581.809953172.66.147.243192.168.215.12TCP6680 → 48970 [FIN, ACK] Seq=934 Ack=77 Win=523904 Len=0 TSval=2353495794 TSecr=1575692791
591.809990192.168.215.12172.66.147.243TCP6648970 → 80 [ACK] Seq=77 Ack=935 Win=64512 Len=0 TSval=1575692821 TSecr=2353495794
601.809954172.66.147.243192.168.215.12TCP6680 → 48970 [RST, ACK] Seq=935 Ack=77 Win=0 Len=0 TSval=2353495794 TSecr=1575692791
611.810112172.66.147.243192.168.215.12TCP5480 → 48970 [RST] Seq=935 Win=0 Len=0
621.835757198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP74443 → 38668 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65408 Len=0 MSS=65479 TSval=1990934601 TSecr=1012146895 WS=128
631.835776192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64512 Len=0 TSval=1012146945 TSecr=1990934601
641.837800192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TLSv1.21634Client Hello (SNI=www.wikipedia.org)
651.837882198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP66443 → 38668 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1569 Win=522624 Len=0 TSval=1990934603 TSecr=1012146947
661.867152198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TLSv1.34563Server Hello, Change Cipher Spec, Application Data, Application Data, Application Data, Application Data
671.867174192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1569 Ack=4498 Win=60416 Len=0 TSval=1012146977 TSecr=1990934632
681.869283192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TLSv1.3130Change Cipher Spec, Application Data
691.869350198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP66443 → 38668 [ACK] Seq=4498 Ack=1633 Win=524160 Len=0 TSval=1990934635 TSecr=1012146979
701.869428192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TLSv1.3194Application Data
711.869457198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP66443 → 38668 [ACK] Seq=4498 Ack=1761 Win=524032 Len=0 TSval=1990934635 TSecr=1012146979
721.869460192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TLSv1.3114Application Data
731.869523198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP66443 → 38668 [ACK] Seq=4498 Ack=1809 Win=524032 Len=0 TSval=1990934635 TSecr=1012146979
741.898615198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TLSv1.3640Application Data, Application Data
751.901549198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TLSv1.32836Application Data
761.901587192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1809 Ack=7842 Win=63488 Len=0 TSval=1012147011 TSecr=1990934664
771.901625192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TLSv1.397Application Data
781.901674198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP66443 → 38668 [ACK] Seq=7842 Ack=1840 Win=524160 Len=0 TSval=1990934667 TSecr=1012147011
791.903757198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=7842 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934669 TSecr=1012147011
801.903805192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=10554 Win=63488 Len=0 TSval=1012147013 TSecr=1990934669
811.904710198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=10554 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934670 TSecr=1012147013
821.904745192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=13266 Win=63488 Len=0 TSval=1012147014 TSecr=1990934670
831.908126198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP5490443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=13266 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=5424 TSval=1990934673 TSecr=1012147014
841.908162192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=18690 Win=63488 Len=0 TSval=1012147018 TSecr=1990934673
851.909237198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TLSv1.32778Application Data
861.909263192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=21402 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=1012147019 TSecr=1990934674
871.922639198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=21402 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934688 TSecr=1012147019
881.922651192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=24114 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=1012147032 TSecr=1990934688
891.925045198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=24114 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934690 TSecr=1012147032
901.925051192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=26826 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=1012147035 TSecr=1990934690
911.933942198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP8202443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=26826 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=8136 TSval=1990934699 TSecr=1012147035
921.933991192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=34962 Win=63488 Len=0 TSval=1012147044 TSecr=1990934699
931.936143198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TLSv1.32778Application Data
941.936432192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=37674 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=1012147046 TSecr=1990934701
951.938566198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TLSv1.32778Application Data
961.938581192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=40386 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=1012147048 TSecr=1990934704
971.941473198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP5490443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=40386 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=5424 TSval=1990934707 TSecr=1012147048
981.941537192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=45810 Win=63488 Len=0 TSval=1012147051 TSecr=1990934707
991.943491198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=45810 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934709 TSecr=1012147051
1001.943524192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=48522 Win=63488 Len=0 TSval=1012147053 TSecr=1990934709
1011.945545198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=48522 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934711 TSecr=1012147053
1021.945579192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=51234 Win=63488 Len=0 TSval=1012147055 TSecr=1990934711
1031.947854198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=51234 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934713 TSecr=1012147055
1041.947925192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=53946 Win=63488 Len=0 TSval=1012147058 TSecr=1990934713
1051.949052198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TLSv1.38202Application Data
1061.949104192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=62082 Win=57344 Len=0 TSval=1012147059 TSecr=1990934714
1071.952324198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=62082 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934717 TSecr=1012147059
1081.952334192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=64794 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=1012147062 TSecr=1990934717
1091.953479198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=64794 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934719 TSecr=1012147062
1101.953494192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=67506 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=1012147063 TSecr=1990934719
1111.957533198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TLSv1.35490Application Data, Application Data
1121.957559192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=72930 Win=59392 Len=0 TSval=1012147067 TSecr=1990934723
1131.958628198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=72930 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934724 TSecr=1012147067
1141.958634192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=75642 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=1012147068 TSecr=1990934724
1151.961859198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=75642 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934727 TSecr=1012147068
1161.961871192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=78354 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=1012147072 TSecr=1990934727
1171.964142198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TLSv1.310914Application Data
1181.964176192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=89202 Win=57344 Len=0 TSval=1012147074 TSecr=1990934729
1191.966717198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=89202 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934732 TSecr=1012147074
1201.966784192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=91914 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=1012147076 TSecr=1990934732
1211.969158198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=91914 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934734 TSecr=1012147076
1221.969219192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=94626 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=1012147079 TSecr=1990934734
1231.970071198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP5490443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=94626 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=5424 TSval=1990934735 TSecr=1012147079
1241.970164192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=100050 Win=63488 Len=0 TSval=1012147080 TSecr=1990934735
1251.973060198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TLSv1.38202Application Data
1261.973090192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=108186 Win=57344 Len=0 TSval=1012147083 TSecr=1990934738
1271.975051198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP8202443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=108186 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=8136 TSval=1990934740 TSecr=1012147083
1281.975063192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=116322 Win=57344 Len=0 TSval=1012147085 TSecr=1990934740
1291.978317198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP2778443 → 38668 [PSH, ACK] Seq=116322 Ack=1840 Win=524288 Len=2712 TSval=1990934743 TSecr=1012147085
1301.978331192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=119034 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=1012147088 TSecr=1990934743
1311.979484198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TLSv1.35490Application Data
1321.979501192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=124458 Win=59392 Len=0 TSval=1012147089 TSecr=1990934745
1331.983329198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TLSv1.34858Application Data
1341.983342192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1840 Ack=129250 Win=59392 Len=0 TSval=1012147093 TSecr=1990934748
1351.983452192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TLSv1.3114Application Data
1361.983474192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TLSv1.390Application Data
1371.983498198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP66443 → 38668 [ACK] Seq=129250 Ack=1888 Win=524160 Len=0 TSval=1990934749 TSecr=1012147093
1381.983498198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP66443 → 38668 [ACK] Seq=129250 Ack=1912 Win=524160 Len=0 TSval=1990934749 TSecr=1012147093
1391.983884192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP6638668 → 443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1912 Ack=129250 Win=63488 Len=0 TSval=1012147094 TSecr=1990934749
1401.983911198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP66443 → 38668 [ACK] Seq=129250 Ack=1913 Win=524160 Len=0 TSval=1990934749 TSecr=1012147093
1412.095650198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TLSv1.390Application Data
1422.095667192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP5438668 → 443 [RST] Seq=1913 Win=0 Len=0
1432.095764198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP66443 → 38668 [FIN, ACK] Seq=129274 Ack=1913 Win=524288 Len=0 TSval=1990934861 TSecr=1012147094
1442.095779192.168.215.12198.35.26.224TCP5438668 → 443 [RST] Seq=1913 Win=0 Len=0
1452.095765198.35.26.224192.168.215.12TCP66443 → 38668 [RST, ACK] Seq=129275 Ack=1913 Win=0 Len=0 TSval=1990934861 TSecr=1012147094
packet detail

Select a frame to inspect it.

bytes

Frames with an exported byte dump: 12, 13, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30.

flow graph · one page load, start to finish19 frames · 192.168.215.12:55142 ⇄ 188.184.67.127:80
19 frames · click any arrow

DNS lookup, three-way handshake, the GET and its 200, then the teardown — every arrow is a frame from the capture. Stepping through selects the frame above, so the detail and byte panes follow along.

http streams followed
GETinfo.cern.ch/hypertext/WWW/TheProject.html200
===================================================================
Node 0: 192.168.215.12:55142
Node 1: 188.184.67.127:80

GET /hypertext/WWW/TheProject.html HTTP/1.1
Host: info.cern.ch
User-Agent: curl/8.21.0
Accept: */*

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 00:54:19 GMT
Server: Apache
Last-Modified: Thu, 03 Dec 1992 08:37:20 GMT
ETag: "8a9-291e721905000"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 2217
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html

<HEADER>
<TITLE>The World Wide Web project</TITLE>
<NEXTID N="55">
</HEADER>
<BODY>
<H1>World Wide Web</H1>The WorldWideWeb (W3) is a wide-area<A
NAME=0 HREF="WhatIs.html">
hypermedia</A> information retrieval
initiative aiming to give universal
access to a large universe of documents.<P>
Everything there is online about
W3 is linked directly or indirectly
to this document, including an <A
NAME=24 HREF="Summary.html">executive
summary</A> of the project, <A
NAME=29 HREF="Administration/Mailing/Overview.html">Mailing lists</A>
, <A
NAME=30 HREF="Policy.html">Policy</A> , November's  <A
NAME=34 HREF="News/9211.html">W3  news</A> ,
<A
NAME=41 HREF="FAQ/List.html">Frequently Asked Questions</A> .
<DL>
<DT><A
NAME=44 HREF="../DataSources/Top.html">What's out there?</A>
<DD> Pointers to the
world's online information,<A
NAME=45 HREF="../DataSources/bySubject/Overview.html"> subjects</A>
, <A
NAME=z54 HREF="../DataSources/WWW/Servers.html">W3 servers</A>, etc.
<DT><A
NAME=46 HREF="Help.html">Help</A>
<DD> on the browser you are using
<DT><A
NAME=13 HREF="Status.html">Software Products</A>
<DD> A list of W3 project
components and their current state.
(e.g. <A
NAME=27 HREF="LineMode/Browser.html">Line Mode</A> ,X11 <A
NAME=35 HREF="Status.html#35">Viola</A> ,  <A
NAME=26 HREF="NeXT/WorldWideWeb.html">NeXTStep</A>
, <A
NAME=25 HREF="Daemon/Overview.html">Servers</A> , <A
NAME=51 HREF="Tools/Overview.html">Tools</A> ,<A
NAME=53 HREF="MailRobot/Overview.html"> Mail robot</A> ,<A
NAME=52 HREF="Status.html#57">
Library</A> )
<DT><A
NAME=47 HREF="Technical.html">Technical</A>
<DD> Details of protocols, formats,
program internals etc
<DT><A
NAME=40 HREF="Bibliography.html">Bibliography</A>
<DD> Paper documentation
on  W3 and references.
<DT><A
NAME=14 HREF="People.html">People</A>
<DD> A list of some people involved
in the project.
<DT><A
NAME=15 HREF="History.html">History</A>
<DD> A summary of the history
of the project.
<DT><A
NAME=37 HREF="Helping.html">How can I help</A> ?
<DD> If you would like
to support the web..
<DT><A
NAME=48 HREF="../README.html">Getting code</A>
<DD> Getting the code by<A
NAME=49 HREF="LineMode/Defaults/Distribution.html">
anonymous FTP</A> , etc.</A>
</DL>
</BODY>

===================================================================
GETexample.com/200
===================================================================
Node 0: 192.168.215.12:48970
Node 1: 172.66.147.243:80

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
User-Agent: curl/8.21.0
Accept: */*

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 00:54:19 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Server: cloudflare
Last-Modified: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 21:56:22 GMT
Allow: GET, HEAD
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Age: 6
cf-cache-status: HIT
CF-RAY: a5b286137c37dab4-LAX
alt-svc: h3=":443"; ma=86400

<!doctype html><html lang=en><head><meta charset=utf-8><link rel=icon href=data:,><meta name=viewport content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1"><title>Example Domain</title><style>html{color-scheme:light dark;background:light-dark(#eee,#222)}body{font:16px/1.6 system-ui,sans-serif;max-width:26em;margin:auto;padding:25vh 2em 2em;text-align:center}</style></head><body><p>This domain is for use in documentation examples without needing permission. This is not a service; avoid relying on it for testing and monitoring purposes.</p><script src=/s.js></script></body></html>

===================================================================
protocol hierarchy
  • ipv66
  • icmpv66
  • arp7
  • ip132
  • udp20
  • dns20
  • tcp112
  • http4
  • data-text-lines2
  • tls20
  • tls8
top conversations by volume
192.168.215.12 ⇄ 198.35.26.224133.6 kB85 f
192.168.215.12 ⇄ 188.184.67.1273.3 kB13 f
192.168.215.12 ⇄ 0.250.250.2002.5 kB20 f
192.168.215.12 ⇄ 172.66.147.2431.9 kB14 f

How it was built

tshark on a scratch interface while the machine resolved four names, fetched two plain-HTTP pages and opened two TLS connections. The capture was saved as pcapng, then exported to JSON for the viewer. The pcap itself is not published — it contains the browsing of the machine that made it.

lab3-capture.json

Delivered

  • DNS queries matched to their responses
  • TCP three-way handshake traced frame by frame
  • Two HTTP streams followed end to end
  • Display filters for DNS, TCP and HTTP

Outcome

Captured and analyzed live network traffic with Wireshark and tshark, tracing DNS resolution, the TCP three-way handshake, HTTP request/response pairs and TLS sessions across a 145-frame capture.

Apache web server on Linux

Ubuntu running Apache, managed entirely from the terminal: installed, started, stopped, enabled, customised, broken twice on purpose, and fixed both times.

abe@app-server-01: ~42 commands · recorded 2026-11-16
step 0 / 12

The real session ran in 3.996s, so playback steps through the recorded output at reading pace. Nothing here is typed in by hand — every line came out of the container.

How it was built

Ubuntu under systemd, so systemctl and journalctl behave exactly as they do on a normal VM. The session was recorded live, so the timings, PIDs and error output are what the machine actually produced.

lab4-session.json

Delivered

  • Full service lifecycle with systemctl
  • Custom site served and verified over curl
  • Configuration and logs located and read
  • Two failures reproduced, diagnosed and fixed

Problems solved

  • AH00526: Invalid command on restartA misspelled directive appended to apache2.conf. configtest named the file and line before the restart was attempted, and the restart then failed with a control-process error. Removing the line returned Syntax OK.
  • 403 after chmod 600 on index.htmlApache runs as www-data and could no longer read the file. The access log showed 403 and the error log the exact cause — AH00132, file permissions deny server access. chmod 644 restored it.

Outcome

Installed and administered Apache on Ubuntu from the command line, managing the service with systemctl and journalctl, and diagnosing a configuration syntax error (AH00526) and a file-permission failure (AH00132) from the logs.

Active Directory identity lab

A domain with organisational units, users and security groups, plus a file share whose access is granted through group membership rather than per-user rights.

LAB.LOCALSamba AD DC · DC01 · 5 users · 2 security groups

How it was built

A Samba 4 domain controller provisioned as LAB.LOCAL with OUs for Staff, IT and Groups; five user accounts; HR-Team and IT-Admins security groups; and an smb.conf share restricted to @HR-Team. NT ACLs are stored in an eadb file because the container filesystem has no extended-attribute support. The access list on this page is computed from the real group membership in the directory.

lab5-directory.json

Delivered

  • OU, user and security group structure
  • Share access granted through group membership
  • Access verified for members and non-members
  • Joiner and leaver changes handled through groups

Outcome

Built an Active Directory domain on a Samba AD domain controller, creating OUs, user accounts and security groups, and granting file-share access through group membership rather than per-user rights.

RMF, ATO & the Full IT Lifecycle

The seven-step Risk Management Framework from Prepare to Monitor, what an authorization package actually contains, and how everyday IT work — imaging, Active Directory, networking, patching — becomes RMF evidence.

RMF, ATO & the Full IT Lifecyclestudy playbook · verified 2026-11-02

RMF: what it actually is

NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2 describes seven steps: Prepare, Categorize, Select, Implement, Assess, Authorize, Monitor. RMF is an ongoing organizational and system risk process, not a one-time security scan, a checklist, or an eMASS button.

  • ATO (Authorization to Operate) is a risk-based decision by the Authorizing Official (AO). The AO may authorize or deny; authorization is not proof of zero vulnerabilities.
  • NIST SP 800-53 supplies control requirements; SP 800-53B supplies baselines; SP 800-53A supplies assessment procedures. Agency/DoD overlays and policy determine applicable implementation.

The full seven-step workflow

step 01 / 07

PREPARE

establish mission, stakeholders, roles, risk strategy, assets, architecture, common controls, authorization boundary and monitoring approach.

step 02 / 07

CATEGORIZE

determine information/system impact (confidentiality, integrity, availability), identify information types, document and approve categorization.

step 03 / 07

SELECT

choose/tailor baseline, document inheritance and responsibilities, create control implementation plan.

step 04 / 07

IMPLEMENT

configure controls in actual IT components; describe how controls operate in SSP and collect implementation evidence.

step 05 / 07

ASSESS

independent or designated assessor plans and tests controls (examine, interview, test), records results and weaknesses in SAR.

step 06 / 07

AUTHORIZE

system owner assembles package, risk is analyzed, AO decides whether residual risk is acceptable; record terms/conditions.

step 07 / 07

MONITOR

track control performance, assets, changes, vulnerabilities, POA&Ms and reporting; reassess/re-authorize as required by policy and risk.

ATO application, routing and decision

  • System Security Plan (SSP): boundary, architecture, data flows, inventory, inherited and system-specific control implementations.
  • Security Assessment Plan (SAP): agreed scope and assessment methods. Security Assessment Report (SAR): test outcomes, findings and risk analysis.
  • Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M): weaknesses, corrective actions, owner, milestones and completion evidence.
  • NIST Authorize-step package includes an executive summary, security/privacy plans, assessment reports and POA&M. Agency-specific artifacts, approvals and formats can add requirements.

System owner/ISSO coordinates evidence and package; assessor provides assessment results; risk stakeholders review; the AO (not Nessus, STIG Viewer, or eMASS) makes the authorization decision. If authorized, operation continues subject to stated conditions and monitoring. If not, address risks and follow the agency's process.

Do not claim every ATO has a universal three-year expiration. Organization/DoD policy and authorization strategy set conditions and review requirements. Material changes, major incidents, or unacceptable risk can trigger reassessment or authorization action; ongoing authorization is possible.

How everyday IT implements RMF controls

  • BIOS/UEFI: Secure Boot, TPM, firmware updates, restricted firmware changes, external boot policy. Often CM-6, CM-2, SI-2, IA/SC depending on actual requirement. Verify device support and recovery impact.
  • Reimaging/endpoint deployment: approved golden image, patch level, BitLocker key escrow, EDR, local admin restrictions, baseline validation, inventory updates. Evidence: deployment logs, build versions, post-image checks.
  • Active Directory: privileged groups, join/leave, GPOs, account lifecycle, MFA integration, service accounts, auditing, time sync. Evidence: approved access review, GPO result, audit logs.
  • Networking: VLANs, routing, ACLs, firewalls, DNS/DHCP, management-plane access, encrypted administration, logging. Evidence: diagrams, approved rules, configuration exports and tested connectivity.
  • Servers and virtualization: patching, backups, hypervisor configuration, snapshots versus recoverable backups, capacity, change control.
  • Help desk and SOC: ticket evidence, access approvals, malware response, vulnerability triage, incident escalation, user training, monitoring.

Control mappings are illustrative, not one-to-one: a single activity may support several controls, and a control may require more than one technical and procedural safeguard.

Worked example: Windows 11 fleet reaches ATO

Fictional lab: 100 Windows 11 endpoints in a managed authorization boundary. The team inventories devices, determines data sensitivity and boundary, selects applicable controls, builds a secure image, enables supported firmware protections, deploys GPO/MDM settings, configures logging and scanning, runs STIG assessments and authenticated vulnerability scans, fixes high-risk findings, records remaining issues, and produces SSP/SAR/POA&M evidence. AO considers residual risk and issues a decision; the team monitors thereafter.

  • Critical distinction: imaging is an implementation activity, while subsequent reimaging, patching and configuration drift management are part of change management and continuous monitoring.

Interview practice: defensible answers

question 1 / 9
Q1

Walk me through RMF from beginning to ATO.

defensible answer

We prepare and define the system, categorize impact, select and tailor controls, implement controls across IT, assess effectiveness, then package the SSP, assessment results and POA&M for the AO's risk decision. After authorization we continuously monitor and update the risk picture.

Q2

What is the difference between an ATO and RMF?

defensible answer

RMF is the full risk-management lifecycle. ATO is a decision at Authorize, with ongoing conditions and monitoring.

Q3

What happens if Nessus finds a critical vulnerability?

defensible answer

Validate exposure, asset and scan quality; prioritize with mission impact; assign remediation; rescan; document unresolved risk and POA&M as required; escalate according to policy. A scanner does not grant or revoke ATO.

Q4

Is a STIG finding automatically an ATO denial?

defensible answer

No. It is evidence of a weakness requiring evaluation. The AO decides on aggregate residual risk under applicable policy; some conditions can be disqualifying.

Q5

Who owns a control?

defensible answer

The system owner is accountable for the system; technical implementers operate safeguards; the assessor evaluates; the AO accepts or rejects risk. Specific control ownership and inheritance are documented.

Q6

What is the difference between SSP, SAR and POA&M?

defensible answer

SSP explains planned/implemented safeguards; SAR documents assessment results; POA&M tracks corrective action on weaknesses.

Q7

How does AD relate to RMF?

defensible answer

AD and GPO implement access, authentication and configuration requirements. Membership reviews, policy results and audit records provide evidence.

Q8

How do you handle a major architecture change after ATO?

defensible answer

Follow change control, update boundary and SSP, assess affected controls and risk, inform authorization stakeholders and seek the required authorization action.

Q9

Can you say you obtained an ATO?

defensible answer

Only if you actually participated in the process and can name your role. Otherwise describe what you implemented, assessed or documented.

One-week RMF lab plan

  1. Day 1Draw a one-page boundary and inventory for a fictional office system.
  2. Day 2Write categorization rationale and a short control responsibility matrix.
  3. Day 3Build secure endpoint/AD/network configuration evidence.
  4. Day 4Run safe assessments and save raw evidence.
  5. Day 5Write 3 control narratives, a mock SAR finding and POA&M.
  6. Day 6Assemble a mock executive summary and authorization package.
  7. Day 7Rehearse AO briefing, remediation questions and continuous-monitoring plan.

Official references

Verified against the linked official publications and vendor documentation on 2026-11-02. Version-specific interfaces, agency overlays, and authorization requirements must be confirmed in the actual environment. Fictional examples are training scenarios, not claims of production experience.

source: capture/playbooks/01_RMF_ATO_Lifecycle_Interview_2026-11.pdf

How it was built

A study playbook written against NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2 and the NIST Authorize-step documentation, verified on 2 November 2026. It walks the full workflow, routes an authorization package from system owner to Authorizing Official, maps ordinary IT operations to control families and rehearses nine interview questions. The worked example is a fictional 100-endpoint Windows 11 fleet, and the playbook says so rather than implying a real authorization.

lab6-rmf.json

Delivered

  • Seven-step workflow with the evidence each step produces
  • SSP, SAP/SAR and POA&M roles in the authorization package
  • IT-to-control mapping for imaging, AD, networking and SOC work
  • Nine interview questions with defensible answers
  • A one-week lab plan and three official references

Problems solved

  • Treating ATO as a scan resultThe playbook keeps the decision with the AO: a scanner, STIG Viewer or eMASS never grants or revokes an ATO, and a STIG finding is evidence of a weakness, not an automatic denial.
  • Claiming a universal three-year ATO expirationOrganization and DoD policy set the conditions and review requirements; material changes or unacceptable risk can trigger reassessment, and ongoing authorization is possible.

Outcome

Studied and documented the NIST SP 800-37 RMF lifecycle end to end — categorization, control selection and tailoring, SSP/SAR/POA&M packaging and the AO authorization decision — with a one-week lab plan and rehearsed interview answers.

ACAS / Nessus Practical Mastery

An authorized hands-on Nessus workflow from scope and credentials through validated findings, remediation tickets and rescans — plus the credentialed-scan traps interviewers probe and how scan output becomes RMF evidence.

ACAS / Nessus Practical Masterystudy playbook · verified 2026-11-02

ACAS, Nessus and Security Center are not synonyms

Nessus is Tenable's vulnerability scanner. Tenable Security Center centralizes assets, scan policies, scanners, results and reporting. DoD ACAS is an enterprise capability using authorized Tenable components under DoD program configuration and policy; a home Nessus install is NOT an ACAS deployment.

  • A scanner identifies possible exposures; the analyst validates, contextualizes and coordinates remediation. A scanner does not establish full compliance or authorize operation.

Authorized hands-on Nessus workflow

step 01 / 08

Use an isolated lab or written authorization.

Define IP range, allowed ports, maintenance window, owners and expected scan impact.

step 02 / 08

Install a supported Nessus edition using vendor instructions

activate legitimate license; update plugins and verify scanner health.

step 03 / 08

Add test targets and scan policy.

Prefer a discovery or basic vulnerability scan initially; use conservative concurrency on fragile assets.

step 04 / 08

Configure approved credentials in the scan policy

protect secrets in the platform, avoid plaintext exports and follow credential rotation rules.

step 05 / 08

Run a scan, record scan time, targets, plugin set and credential status.

Review host coverage and failures before treating findings as complete.

step 06 / 08

Filter by host, severity, plugin ID, affected software, evidence and exploitability context

validate critical/high results with safe host-side checks.

step 07 / 08

Open remediation tickets with owner, affected asset, finding, business impact, fix plan and due date

change through normal operations.

step 08 / 08

Rescan and verify.

Document exceptions and residual risk; feed appropriate findings into POA&M and RMF reporting.

Authenticated scans: major interview trap

Tenable states Windows local checks often need administrative privileges to read required registry/files. Linux/Unix package inspection likewise requires sufficient privilege. Authentication success alone is not proof of full credentialed-check coverage. Grant only approved scope and privileges needed for the checks, with monitoring and credential safeguards.

  • Check the scan's credentialed-check evidence and authentication-related plugins; Tenable identifies plugin 21745 as a login failure indicator. Do not assume absence of 21745 proves full patch inventory.
  • An uncredentialed scan may miss missing patches or local configuration issues. An authenticated scan can still miss assets, checks or software.

Prioritize findings responsibly

  • Distinguish severity score from mission risk: CVSS, exploit evidence, internet exposure, critical assets, compensating controls and business consequences.
  • Validate false positives without dismissing evidence. A vulnerability is not remediated just because a ticket was closed.
  • Do not promise a fixed remediation SLA without knowing the applicable DoD/agency/contract requirements.
  • Never launch intrusive scans against production, OT, medical, or third-party systems without approval and safety planning.

How scans support RMF

During Implement, admins deploy patches and secure settings. During Assess, scan outputs help test selected controls and identify weaknesses. During Monitor, recurring scans reveal new vulnerabilities, drift and remediation progress. Findings can support RA-5, SI-2, CM controls and relevant assessment artifacts; mapping depends on context.

A scan export is evidence, not the SSP, SAR or an ATO decision. A POA&M item should reference validated weakness, impact, owner, mitigation and milestone.

Interview questions with sample answers

question 1 / 6
Q1

ACAS versus Nessus?

defensible answer

Nessus is a scanning engine/product. ACAS is the DoD enterprise vulnerability assessment capability and includes centrally managed scanning/reporting components. The exact deployment is controlled by the organization.

Q2

Credentialed scan versus noncredentialed?

defensible answer

Authenticated scans inspect local inventory and configuration when permissions allow; remote-only scans mainly observe exposed services and fingerprints. I verify that checks really succeeded.

Q3

What if a critical finding is false positive?

defensible answer

Verify plugin output, installed version, patch/backport status, configuration and vendor guidance. Record the evidence and follow the organization's exception/dispute process.

Q4

What if a host did not appear in the scan?

defensible answer

Verify inventory, IP/hostname, scope, routing, firewall, credentials, scan logs and timing. No finding is not proof the host is safe.

Q5

How do you report to leadership?

defensible answer

Describe exposed assets, validated risks, owners, progress and unresolved blockers rather than dumping plugin counts.

Q6

How do you support ATO?

defensible answer

Provide current, reproducible vulnerability evidence, remediation records, exceptions and POA&M inputs for the authorization package and monitoring.

Practice exercise

  1. 01Create a two-host isolated VM lab; scan with and without approved credentials.
  2. 02Compare detection and authenticated-check coverage; record one finding's plugin evidence.
  3. 03Remediate or document a safe exception; rescan; draft a one-page vulnerability report and mock POA&M.

Official references

Verified against the linked official publications and vendor documentation on 2026-11-02. Version-specific interfaces, agency overlays, and authorization requirements must be confirmed in the actual environment. Fictional examples are training scenarios, not claims of production experience.

source: capture/playbooks/02_ACAS_Nessus_Interview_Lab_2026-11.pdf

How it was built

A study playbook written against Tenable Security Center and credentialed-check documentation and NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2, verified on 2 November 2026. It separates Nessus, Tenable Security Center and DoD ACAS, walks an eight-step authorized scan workflow, checks credentialed coverage against plugin 21745, and maps findings to RA-5, SI-2 and CM controls. The practice exercise is a two-host isolated lab, not a production scan.

lab7-acas.json

Delivered

  • Eight-step authorized scanning workflow
  • Credentialed-scan coverage checks, including plugin 21745
  • Severity-versus-mission-risk prioritisation rules
  • Six interview questions with sample answers
  • Scan evidence mapped to RA-5, SI-2 and CM controls

Problems solved

  • Calling a home Nessus install ACASACAS is the DoD enterprise capability under program configuration and policy. The playbook states the distinction plainly instead of borrowing the acronym for a lab scanner.
  • Trusting authentication success as coverageA successful login is not proof the local checks ran. The playbook checks credentialed-check evidence and authentication plugins, and never treats the absence of plugin 21745 as a full patch inventory.

Outcome

Documented an authorized Nessus scanning workflow — credentialed coverage verification, plugin-evidence validation, remediation ticketing and rescan — and mapped scan output to RMF Assess/Monitor evidence and POA&M entries.

DISA STIGs & Checklist Mastery

The DISA STIG checklist workflow end to end: pick the right benchmark, run each Check Text on an authorized asset, set status from evidence, write Finding Details and Comments that survive review, and save and reimport the checklist.

DISA STIGs & Checklist Masterystudy playbook · verified 2026-11-02

STIG, SRG, checklist, SCAP: know the distinctions

DISA Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) give technology-specific requirements and check/fix guidance. Security Requirements Guides (SRGs) are broader requirements. XCCDF benchmark content is not itself an assessed checklist. SCAP tools can automate some checks, but manual validation remains necessary.

As of 2026-11-02 DISA Cyber Exchange lists STIG Viewer 3.8.1 (released 2026-10-02). Viewer 3 uses JSON .cklb checklists; legacy .ckl is XML. Use a format your receiving system supports, and test the export/import.

Download and open a real STIG

step 01 / 10

Go to https://www.cyber.mil/stigs/downloads/ and find the exact technology/OS version.

Confirm publication date, STIG version and release.

step 02 / 10

Go to https://www.cyber.mil/stigs/srg-stig-tools and obtain STIG Viewer 3.8.1 for your platform, verify publisher/hash per site guidance.

step 03 / 10

Install/run locally.

In Viewer add the benchmark to the library, using its supported XCCDF content or STIG compilation.

step 04 / 10

Create a checklist from the benchmark for a named LAB asset.

Record hostname, asset identity, OS/build, benchmark version and assessment date.

step 05 / 10

Select a rule

read Rule ID/STIG ID, severity, discussion, Check Text, Fix Text and CCI mapping.

step 06 / 10

Execute the Check Text on the authorized system

save relevant command output, screenshot or configuration export.

step 07 / 10

Set status according to evidence: Open, Not a Finding, Not Applicable, or Not Reviewed.

Do not equate Not Reviewed with compliant.

step 08 / 10

Fill Finding Details with observed technical state

Comments with assessment context, justification, remediation or retest notes.

step 09 / 10

Save as .cklb.

If downstream requires .ckl, use the appropriate export and confirm compatibility.

step 10 / 10

Reopen the file and sample several entries

export a report; keep the original evidence under approved handling rules.

What good comments actually look like

checklist comment · templateNot a Finding

LAB-WIN11-01 | 2026-11-02 | Assessor: lab user. Check method: reviewed the relevant Local Security Policy setting. Observed value: [actual value]. Requirement: [STIG threshold]. Result: compliant. Evidence: LAB-001. This is a fictional template; replace brackets with observed facts.

checklist comment · templateOpen

LAB-WIN11-01 | 2026-11-02. Check method: [command/path]. Observed value [x] differs from required [y]. Risk/impact: [reason]. Ticket [ID]; assigned to [owner]; retest pending. Evidence LAB-002.

checklist comment · templateNot Applicable

Not Applicable requires an actual rule-specific reason such as the feature/service not installed or the benchmark's stated applicability condition being absent. Explain and document verification; do not use N/A to hide an inconvenient finding.

Version updates and review quality

  • A new STIG release can add/change/remove rules. Review differences; do not blindly carry forward every old status or comment.
  • Some findings are only partially automatable. Automated 'pass' requires corroboration when manual checks or scope restrictions apply.
  • Severity category and CCI mapping are useful metadata; a STIG rule is not automatically equivalent to full satisfaction of a NIST control.
  • Do not paste secrets, sensitive configurations or production screenshots into public tools.

How STIG work flows into RMF

STIG implementation often supports RMF Implement; checklists and verification evidence support Assess; recurring rechecks and version updates support Monitor. Open findings may require remediation plans, risk treatment and POA&M entries. The assessor and AO evaluate evidence in the context of the full system.

Interview questions

question 1 / 6
Q1

What is a STIG?

defensible answer

A DISA technology-specific hardening/assessment guide with explicit check and fix procedures.

Q2

STIG Viewer versus SCAP?

defensible answer

Viewer is a human checklist/benchmark tool; SCAP tooling automates supported checks. Neither removes the need to verify applicability and evidence.

Q3

What belongs in Finding Details versus Comments?

defensible answer

Finding Details records the technical observed state; Comments capture context, rationale, actions, evidence pointers and review notes.

Q4

When is Not Applicable acceptable?

defensible answer

When the specific requirement genuinely does not apply and I can document why, not simply because I couldn't test it.

Q5

How do you close a finding?

defensible answer

Approved remediation, rerun check, record observed compliant state, update checklist, preserve evidence and reconcile related tickets/POA&M.

Q6

How do you treat new STIG versions?

defensible answer

Compare releases, reassess affected rules, document migration and avoid unverified carryover.

Lab checklist

  1. 01Assess ten Windows 11 lab rules, including at least one Open, one Not a Finding and one justified N/A if genuinely applicable.
  2. 02Save .cklb, export .ckl if supported, reopen, compare rule count/status/comments and write a short findings memo.

Official references

Verified against the linked official publications and vendor documentation on 2026-11-02. Version-specific interfaces, agency overlays, and authorization requirements must be confirmed in the actual environment. Fictional examples are training scenarios, not claims of production experience.

source: capture/playbooks/03_DISA_STIG_Checklists_Interview_2026-11.pdf

How it was built

A study playbook written against DISA Cyber Exchange tooling and download guidance (STIG Viewer 3.8.1, released 2026-10-02) and NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2, verified on 2 November 2026. It distinguishes STIG, SRG, XCCDF and SCAP, walks a ten-step checklist workflow, gives three commented status templates and a version-update review routine, and closes with a ten-rule lab checklist. The comment templates are fictional and labelled as such.

lab8-stig.json

Delivered

  • Ten-step checklist workflow from download to saved .cklb
  • Finding Details versus Comments, with three status templates
  • Version-update and review-quality rules
  • Six interview questions with sample answers
  • STIG work mapped to Implement, Assess and Monitor

Problems solved

  • Equating Not Reviewed with compliantStatus follows evidence: Open, Not a Finding, Not Applicable or Not Reviewed. The playbook never lets an untested rule pass as compliant, and never lets N/A hide an inconvenient finding.
  • Carrying old statuses into a new STIG releaseA new release can add, change or remove rules. The playbook compares releases and reassesses affected rules instead of copying every old status and comment forward.

Outcome

Documented the DISA STIG checklist workflow with STIG Viewer 3.8.1: benchmark import, rule-by-rule Check Text execution, evidence-backed Open/Not a Finding/Not Applicable statuses, and .cklb/.ckl export and reimport verification.

eMASS / OpenRMF & Authorization Workflow

How an authorization package moves through eMASS — registration, control narratives, assessments, POA&M, review and the AO decision — and how the same workflow is practiced in an isolated OpenRMF OSS lab without pretending the lab is production.

eMASS / OpenRMF & Authorization Workflowstudy playbook · verified 2026-11-02

eMASS versus OpenRMF: no pretending

eMASS (Enterprise Mission Assurance Support Service) is an authorized workflow/system of record used in DoD RMF contexts. It is not a publicly available sandbox and no open-source clone is equivalent to the production environment. OpenRMF OSS is a separate community/vendor product for managing STIG checklists and related compliance evidence.

DCSA NISP eMASS is a particular environment for cleared industry. Its account process does not automatically describe every DoD eMASS tenant or permission model.

Official eMASS access and learning

  • For DCSA NISP, official guidance lists DISA eMASS CBT, Cyber Awareness training, DCSA SAAR and NISP eMASS registration; eligibility and sponsorship apply.
  • Request access through your organization/security office and follow the current DCSA or agency guide. Do not enter sensitive production data into a personal training instance.
  • Learn roles: system owner, ISSO/ISSM, assessor/SCA, common-control provider, AO and supporting engineers. Permissions and routing vary.

Conceptual eMASS package workflow (not screen-by-screen)

step 01 / 08

Establish system registration and authorization boundary with correct ownership.

step 02 / 08

Record system description, architecture, categorization, baseline and control inheritance.

step 03 / 08

Enter/update control implementation narratives and responsible parties

attach approved supporting evidence.

step 04 / 08

Coordinate control assessments and record assessment status/results, findings and risk.

step 05 / 08

Create/manage POA&M records for tracked weaknesses

assign owner, remediation, milestones and status.

step 06 / 08

Assemble SSP, SAR, POA&M and executive summary plus organization-required artifacts.

step 07 / 08

Route through designated reviews and approvals

AO renders authorization decision.

step 08 / 08

Maintain package under continuous monitoring, updates and reassessment as required.

Exact eMASS menus, import capabilities, approval chains, status labels and permissions cannot be verified from public documentation for every environment; do not memorize fabricated clicks.

OpenRMF OSS hands-on practice

step 01 / 07

Read https://github.com/Cingulara/openrmf-docs and release notes

review supported architecture and prerequisites before installation.

step 02 / 07

Use an isolated Docker lab with the vendor's documented setup, identity provider, configuration and current images.

Do not expose demo services publicly.

step 03 / 07

Create a fictional system package and add sample sanitized STIG checklists in the supported import format.

step 04 / 07

Review Open/Not a Finding/N/A statuses

compare control compliance views; export a CKL/Excel report.

step 05 / 07

Import supported sample SCAP or Nessus scan data

verify version and file-format compatibility.

step 06 / 07

Generate a sample POA&M and assessment/test-plan artifacts where supported by the installed OSS release

inspect and correct the outputs manually.

step 07 / 07

Map a finding to its actual system owner and remediation evidence

demonstrate a status update and reporting.

Vendor OSS docs list CKL/SCAP/Nessus imports, compliance reporting and POA&M export. Do not assume CKLB import, full authorization workflow or all Professional edition document generators are included. Confirm capabilities against the exact installed release.

POA&M example and evidence chain

Fictional: WIN11-LAB-01 missing approved update. Record unique weakness ID; source scan plugin and STIG rule (if both genuinely apply); affected asset; risk/impact; mitigation; assigned owner; milestone; target date; evidence; validation date; closure approval. Avoid duplicating a single underlying issue without cross-references.

Evidence flow

  1. engineer implements change
  2. scanner/STIG assessor verifies
  3. assessor updates findings
  4. ISSO tracks POA&M/control state
  5. package reviewers analyze residual risk
  6. AO makes decision

Neither OpenRMF nor eMASS itself accepts risk on behalf of the AO.

Interview answers: know your experience boundary

question 1 / 6
Q1

What is eMASS used for?

defensible answer

It supports documenting RMF system information, control implementations, assessments, weaknesses, POA&Ms and authorization workflows according to the organization's configuration.

Q2

Have you used eMASS?

defensible answer

If no production access: 'I understand the RMF package workflow and have practiced evidence, checklist and POA&M management in a lab. I have not used production eMASS, so I would follow the organization's training and role-specific workflow.'

Q3

Who issues the ATO?

defensible answer

The AO, based on assessed residual risk. eMASS facilitates the package and workflow; it does not independently grant an ATO.

Q4

What is control inheritance?

defensible answer

A system relies on documented common controls from an approved provider, while retaining responsibility for any system-specific or hybrid portions.

Q5

What is a POA&M?

defensible answer

A tracked plan for a weakness, with impact, corrective actions, owner, milestones, due dates and validation.

Q6

Why use OpenRMF?

defensible answer

To practice managing checklists, scan evidence and RMF-related reporting in a local lab, while clearly distinguishing it from production eMASS.

Seven-day lab and interview plan

  1. Day 1Read DCSA access rules and eMASS CBT material where accessible.
  2. Day 2Deploy a supported OpenRMF OSS lab with sanitized data.
  3. Day 3Import and review STIG checklists; verify status fields.
  4. Day 4Import compatible Nessus/SCAP sample data and reconcile assets.
  5. Day 5Produce POA&M and compliance summary; trace one finding to a control.
  6. Day 6Build a mock SSP/SAR/POA&M package outside the platform.
  7. Day 7Rehearse an AO package briefing and disclose lab versus production experience accurately.

Official references

Verified against the linked official publications and vendor documentation on 2026-11-02. Version-specific interfaces, agency overlays, and authorization requirements must be confirmed in the actual environment. Fictional examples are training scenarios, not claims of production experience.

source: capture/playbooks/04_eMASS_OpenRMF_ATO_Interview_2026-11.pdf

How it was built

A study playbook written against DCSA NISP guidance, the OpenRMF OSS documentation and NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2, verified on 2 November 2026. It gives an eight-step conceptual eMASS package workflow, a seven-step OpenRMF OSS hands-on practice, a POA&M record with its evidence chain to the AO, and six interview answers including an honest response to "have you used eMASS". No production eMASS access is claimed.

lab9-emass.json

Delivered

  • Eight-step conceptual eMASS package workflow
  • Seven-step OpenRMF OSS hands-on practice
  • A POA&M record and its evidence chain to the AO
  • Six interview questions, including the honest eMASS answer
  • DCSA NISP access path and official references

Problems solved

  • Pretending OpenRMF is production eMASSeMASS is an authorized system of record with no public sandbox. The playbook practices the workflow in OpenRMF OSS and says exactly that in the interview answer, rather than claiming production experience.
  • Memorizing fabricated eMASS clicksMenus, imports, approval chains and permissions vary by tenant and cannot be verified from public documentation. The playbook teaches the conceptual workflow and refuses to invent screen-by-screen steps.

Outcome

Documented the eMASS authorization-package workflow and practiced its equivalent in OpenRMF OSS — checklist and scan imports, POA&M tracking and compliance reporting — while stating the production-versus-lab boundary explicitly.

Credentials

Each one links to the issuer's public record.